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Shapiro: Fair Use Defense

COMMENT
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FAIR USE
DEFENSE IN DR. SEUSS
ENTERPRISES v. PENGUIN
"Then our mother came in
And she said to us two,
"Did you have any fun?
Tell me. What did you do?"
And Sally and I did not know
What to say.
Should we tell her
The things that went on there that day?"l
I. INTRODUCTION

In Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc}
the Ninth Circuit considered whether a copyright infringer was
entitled to the affirmative defense of fair use.3 For a derivative
use, such as a parody, fairness must be analyzed on a case-by-

1. DR. SEUSS, THE CAT IN THE HAT 60 (Random House 1957).
2. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Sept. 22,
1997) (No. 97-329) ("Seuss Ir).
3. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399. To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the plaintiff must first show ownership of a valid copyright and, second,
that there was copying of the original. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1563 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("Seuss r). Defendant may then
assert the affirmative defense of fair use. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1566. In claiming
fair use, defendants admit the truth of plaintiifs claim of copyright infringement, but
assert that their copying is exempt because of the application of the fair use defense.
See id.

1
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case basis in light of the goals of copyright law.4 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that Penguin could
not claim the privilege of fair use of Dr. Seuss' copyrighted material. 5 The court reached its conclusion after an analysis of
the four statutory fair use factors, which included findings that
the work was a satire, rather than a parody, and the work was
not transformative.6
Section II of this note sets forth the facts and procedural
history of Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin, which is the most
recent Ninth Circuit copyright decision presenting the affirmative fair use defense. Section III provides a brief background of
copyright law and the fair use defense. Section III also presents a historical view of the fact-sensitive, case-by-case analysis of the four statutory fair use defense factors codified in
17 U.S.C. § 107. Section IV examines the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin, focusing on Seuss En-

4. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994). The goal of
copyright is to create public access to works of science and art by providing an economic
. monopoly for the work's author, thus allowing that author to secure financial remuneration for hislher efforts for a limited amount of time. See Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v;Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
5. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. Fair use is considered the privilege to use
someone else's copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without hislher consent,
notwithstanding the monopoly granted by copyright ownership. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2nd Cir. 1966).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399-1403. Section 107
states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified in that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a
work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered
shall include-(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S. C. § 107.
Parody is considered a form of satire, as are diatribe, narrative, and burlesque. See
SeussII, 109 F.3d at 1400 n.7; Michael C. Albin, Essay, Beyond Fair Use: Putting Satire In Its Proper Place, 33 UCLA L. REV. 518 (1985). A secondary work is considered
transformative if it does not supersede the original and is itself original through the
addition of new expression, meaning or message. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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terprises' copyright infringement claim.7 Section V critically
analyzes the Ninth Circuit's holding, focusing on the validity of
the court's determination that the infringing work was not a
parody, nor transformative. Section VI then briefly summarizes the court's decision and its implications.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. ("Seuss Enterprises") owns most
of the copyright and trademark rights to the family of works
created by Theodor Geisel, better known as Dr. Seuss.8 Dr.
Seuss wrote 47 books, which have collectively sold more than
35 million copies worldwide.9 His books entertain children
through the use of playful rhymes and illustrations of fanciful
creatures. IO The Cat in the Hat was originally published in
1957. 11
In 1995, publishers Dove, Inc. announced the forthcoming
book, The Cat NOT in the Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice, written
by Alan Katz and Chris Wrinn.I2 Penguin Books USA was the
book's distributor. I3 The Cat NOT in the Hat! tells the story of
the Orenthal J. Simpson ("O.J. Simpson") double-murder
trial. 14 Dove promoted the book to the publishing industry as
"rhyming verse and sketches as witty as Theodore [sic] Geisel's

7. See infra notes 17, 22· and accompanying text.
8. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. cknied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1997) (No. 97-329)
("Seuss Ir).
9. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1396.
10. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559,
1561 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("Seuss rJ.
1\. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1396.
12. See id. at 1396-97.
13. See id. at 1396. The named defendants are Penguin Books USA, the distributor of the book; Dove, Inc., Dove II, Inc., and Michael Viner ("Dove"), the book's publishers; and Alan Katz and Chris Wrinn, the book's authors. &e Seuss I, 924 F. Supp.
at 1561. The distributor, publisher, and authors will be referred to collectively as
·Penguin."
14. See Seuss 11,109 F.3d at 1397.
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best. "16 The book featured illustrations that mimicked the distinctive style of Dr. Seuss' works. 16
Seuss Enterprises filed a complaint for copyright infringement and trademark infringement and dilution against Penguin in the District Court for the Southern District
California. 17 At the same time, Seuss Enterprises requested a
temporary restraining order and filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent publication of The Cat NOT in the
Hatt 1S The district court denied the request for a temporary
restraining order, but subsequently granted the preliminary
injunction. 19 The district court's order indicated there was a
strong likelihood that substantial protected expression from
The Cat in the Hat, Horton Hatches the Egg, and One Fish Two
Fish Red Fish Blue Fish had been taken and that Penguin's
fair use defense would not prevail at trial.20 At the time of the
15. Id. In California u. Orenthal James Simpson, the defendant, O.J. Simpson,
was charged with the double-murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ron Goldman. See
Christopher B. Mueller, Introduction: O.J. Simpson and the Criminal Justice System
on Trial, 67 U. COL. R. 727 (1996). The trial lasted 252 days and was frequently referred to as the trial of the century because of the extensive media attention that surrounded every aspect of the proceedings. See id. O.J. Simpson was acquitted of both
murders after only five hours of jury deliberation. See id.
16. See SeussI, 924 F. Supp at 1561. The Cat NOT in the Hat! appropriated the
Cat's striped stovepipe hat, mischievous facial expression, and physical appearance.
See id. at 1564. A caricature of O.J. Simpson, in the Cat's hat, with a recognizably
similar expression, and posed like the Cat, appeared on the front and back covers as
well as thirteen times in the text of the secondary work. See SeussII, 109 F.3d at 1402;
see also infra note 304.
17. See Seu88 1, 924 F. Supp. at 1561-62. A claim for trademark infringement is
concerned with a use of a mark that creates a likelihood of customer confusion over the
source and origin of the goods or services. See Seussl1, 109 F.3d at 1404. Trade dilution provides statutory protection against two kinds of harm: the whittling away of the
distinctiveness of a famous trademark, and the tarnishing of a trademark and its associated good will when the mark is used on inferior products or in unwholesome contexts. See Bruce P. Keller & David H. Bernstein, As Satiric As They Wanna Be: Parody
Lawsuits Under Copyright, Trademark, Dilution and Publicity Laws, 416 PLIIPat
1159, 1173 (1995).
18. See Seussl1, 109 F.3d at 1396.
19. See id. at 1397. A temporary restraining order is a short term emergency remedy which may be issued by the court without notice to the adverse party. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 65. Due to the possibly drastic consequences, the court prefers to hear the
adverse party and determine whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate on the
basis of both parties' positions. See id.
20. See Seuss 1, 924 F. Supp. at 1562. The Copyright Act of 1976 extends copyright protection to original works of authorship. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). It does not
provide protection to any idea, concept, or principle. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). Here,
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district court's order, Penguin had already printed 12,000 copies of The Cat NOT in the Hatf 1
Penguin requested reconsideration of the district court's
findings of facts and conclusions of law based on newly discovered evidence and arguments reasonably omitted at the preliminary injunction hearing. 22 Upon reconsideration, the district court maintained that the balance of hardships tipped
markedly in the favor of Seuss Enterprises.23 Penguin appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit.24
III.

BACKGROUND

Conceptualized by the framers of our Constitution, a copyright is a means of encouraging creative efforts in both the arts
and science.25 Copyright law's ultimate goal is to provide for

Penguin correctly claimed that the typeface, poetic meter, whimsical style or visual
style were not protectable copyright subject matter. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399.
The district court, however, based its preliminary injunction on the cover illustrations
and the use of the Cat's Hat, and not unprotectable copyright subject matter. See id.
21. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1397.
22. See Seuss 1,924 F. Supp. at 1562. Defendants provided an argument and evidence that material used from the book "One Fish Two Fish Red Fish Blue Fish" was
not protectable expression. See Defso' Opening Br., at 7, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). Additionally, material
used from Horton Hatches the Egg was a fair use. See id. Further, defendants argued
that new information suggested a substantial amount of the Seuss artwork created
between 1925 and 1937 had either entered the public domain or was owned by third
parties, and therefore could not support an infringement claim. See id.
23. See Seuss I, 924 F. Supp. at 1575. The district court found that there was a
strong likelihood of copyright infringement of The Cat in the Hat, but not from Horton
Hatches an Egg or from One Fish Two Fish Blue Fish Red Fish. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d
at 1397. The court expected Seuss Enterprises to defeat Penguin's claim offair use and
found that the strong likelihood of success on the copyright claim established a presumption of irreparable harm. See id. Although the court saw a minimal likelihood of
success on the dilution claim, it found there were serious questions for litigation regarding the claims for trademark infringement. See id.
24. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1394.
25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "Congress shall have Power ... to Promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id. Copyright law is designed to "stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual
enrichment of the public." Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward A Fair Use Standard, 103l1ARv. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1990) [hereinafter Toward A Fair Use Standard].
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public access to the products of artists and scientists.26 Copyright law's intent is to motivate the creative activity of authors
and inventors by providing a personal economic incentive to
produce.27 As Justice Stewart recognized in Twentieth Century
Music v. Aiken, "the immediate effect of our copyright law is to
secure a fair return for an author's creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the general public good."28 These two ends are achieved by
granting the author exclusive control over an original work for
a limited time period, creating an economic monopoly.29
Copyright exists in original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.3o A copyright owner has exclusive control over five rights: to reproduce the work, to prepare
derivative works, to distribute the work, to perform the work,
and to display the work.31 The limited time period for these
exclusive rights is the term of the author's life plus fifty
·years.32

26. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
27. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
28. Twentieth Century, 422 U.S. at 156.
29. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
30. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). ·Copyright protection subsists, in accordance
with this title, in original works of authorship fIXed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." ld.
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). Section 106 states:
[T)he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do
and to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted
work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of
the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures
and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the
individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly.
ld.
32. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1994). ·Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a term consisting of the life of the ... author and fIfty years after the
author's death." ld. Prior to the enactment of the 1976 Act, the 1909 Act allowed for a
term of 28 years, beginning with either publication or registration of an unpublished
work. 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). An additional 28 year renewal period is allowed. See id.
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Copyright registration provides a public record of ownership
and is a prerequisite to any claim of copyright infringement.33
An action for copyright infringement requires a plaintiff to
show ownership of a valid copyright and copying of the protected work.34 A court may find copying when substantial
similarity exists between two works and the alleged infringer
had some degree of access to the origina1.35 Alternatively, if the
commonalities resulted from independent creation, the court
may conclude that no copying occurred.3s An infringement will
be recognized where the copying consists of the unlawful appropriation of protected expression.37
Notwithstanding the purpose of copyright, to stimulate
creativity and dissemination of knowledge for the general public good, it has sometimes been necessary to provide an opportunity for limited fair use of copyrighted materials.38 Fair use
is the privilege to use an author's copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without the owner's consent.39 If fair use
were not permitted, "excessively broad protection would stifle,
rather than advance," copyright objectives for two reasons.40
First, there are no wholly original thoughts; virtually all intel-

33. See 17 u.s.c. § 411(a) (1994). Section 411(a) states:
Except for actions for infringement of copyright in Berne Convention
works whose country of origin is not the United States and an action
brought for a violation of the rights of an author under section 106A(a),
and subject to the provisions of subsection (b), no action for infringement of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration
of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with this title.
[d.

34. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
35. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559,
1565 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("Seuss r).
36. Seeid.
37. See Sid & Marty KrofR Tel. Prods., Inc., v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F. 2d 1157,
1165 (9th Cir. 1977).
38. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1109.
39. See Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 306 (2nd Cir.
1966).
40. Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1109. Although copyright law
grants an author exclusive rights to exploit an original work, there is also concern that
such protection does not operate to inhibit the exchange of ideas, a primary purpose of
copyright law. See Debra L. Quentel, -Bad Artists Copy, Good Artists Steal-; The Ugly
Conflict Between Copyright Law and Appropriationism, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 39, 48-49
(1996).
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lectual creativity is in part derivative.41 Second, important areas of intellectual activity, such as philosophy, criticism, and
history, are explicitly referential and require continuous reexamination of previous expression.42 The fair use doctrine effectuates the goals of copyright by protecting and legitimizing
such "secondary" creativity.43
Until the Copyright Act of 1976, fair use was solely a judicially-created doctrine. 44 With that Act, Congress introduced
fair use as a statutory limitation on an author's exclusive
rights. 45 In enacting this limitation, Congress intended for the
courts to continue their common law tradition of fair use adjudication. 46 Congress left interpretation of the Act's text to the
courts, by providing only general guidance, and did not intend
to change, narrow, or enlarge the then-existing, judiciallycreated doctrine.47 Instead, Congress enabled the courts to
avoid rigid application of the copyright statute where the Act
"would stifle the very creativity the law is designed to foster." 48
Thus, a determination of a fair. use requires a case-by-case
analysis of the statutory factors independently and, ultimately,
weighed together. 49 The four factors enumerated in § 107 of

41. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1109. As Justice Story
explained, "[elvery book in literature, science, and art, borrows, and must necessarily
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before." Campbell, 510 U.S. at
575 (citing Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845».
42. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1109. Every advance in
knowledge or art builds on prior work and is therefore referential per se. See Pierre N.
Leva!, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, 13 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 19, 22 (1994) [hereinafter Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Usel.
43. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1110.
44. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994). In Folsom v.
March, Justice Story delineated the inquiry for fair use as: "look to the nature and
objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the
degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede
the objects, of the original work." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh,
9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 107. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
46. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, p. 66 (1976».
47. See id. at 577-78. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
48. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Iowa State University Research Found., Inc. v. American Broad. Co., 621 F.2d 57,60 (2nd Cir. 1980».
49. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
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the Act are: (1) the purpose and character of the secondary use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in the secondary work in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the
secondary use upon the potential value for, or the value of, the
copyrighted work.50 Prior case law illustrates how the courts
have made determinations by relying on fact-sensitive considerations to achieve policy-based decisions consistent with the
goals of copyright. 51
A. FIRST FACTOR: PuRPOSE AND CHARACTER OF USE

In determining whether there has been a fair use, courts
initially focus on the purpose of the use.52 The preamble to
§ 107 provides examples of purposes that may be entitled to a
claim of fair use.53 These examples include criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.54 The list of
categories is neither exhaustive nor exclusive.55 On the other
hand, a claim to one of the named purposes does not establish a
presumption of fair use.56 Instead, a claim of fair use depends
upon the analysis of all four factors, weighed together, in light
.of the goals of copyright.57
A category not explicitly listed in the preamble to § 107 is
parody.58 A parody is commonly defined as a "work that imi-

50. 17 u.s.c. § 107; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
51. See Seuss I, 924 F. Supp. at 1566. Although case-by-case analysis allows for
consideration of a particular situation, it also fosters uncertainty. But see Quentel,
supra note 40, at 52.
52. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th
Cir. 1997) ("Seussll")
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
54. See 17U.S.C. § 107.
55. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399. The categories are merely examples
of purposes entitled to fair use and provide only general guidance about the sorts of
categories found to be fair use. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78.
56. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581.
57. See id. at 578.
58. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107. Parody is a type of satire; satire includes diatribe, narrative, parody and burlesque. See Seuss 11, 109 F.3d at 1400 n.7. Parodies
are accorded protection as vehicles for facilitating political and social discourse. See
Nels Jacobson, Faith Hope & Parody: Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 'Oh Pretty Woman,' and
Parodists'Rights, 31 Rous. L. REV. 955, 1017 (1994).
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tates the characteristic style of an author or work for comic effect or ridicule. OO9 Recognized as a form of criticism, parody
contributes to the public benefit by providing social comment
while creating a new work. 6o Parody achieves its status as social commentary by disparaging the original work, however
slightly, by "pointing out faults, revealing hidden affectations,
emphasizing weaknesses, and diminishing strengths.~l
Recently, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court recognized that an author may claim fair use for a
parody, like other comment or criticism.62 In Campbell, the
Court held that the parodist must use elements of the prior
work to create a new work that, at least in part, comments on
the prior author's work. 63 Parody mimics an original to make
its point and, thus, has some claim to use another's creative
expression.64 The Court differentiated satire from parody, indicating that a satire need not have any critical bearing on the
substance or style of an original work.65 Satire, therefore,
stands "on its own two feet" and requires full justification for
any borrowing from another author's work.66
Whether an infringing work comments on the style or substance of an original work is a subjective determination left to
the broad discretion of the courtS.67 The court must first discern what an original work represents and then what comment
an infringing work may be making about the original.68
Whether a parody is in good taste or bad taste should not be

59. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1317 (3d
ed.1992».

60. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
61. Harriet K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark,
and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B. U. L. REV. 923, 953 (1985).
62. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
63. See id. at 580.
64. See id. at 580-81.
65. See id. A satire is a creative work that relies on humor, irony, derision or wit
to comment on society at large. See id. at 581 n.15.
66. Campi1ell, 510 U.S. at 581.
67. See Kathryn D. Piele, Three Years After Campbell u. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.:
What Is Fair Game for Parodists?, 18 LoY. LA ENT. L.J. 75,98 (1997).
68. See id.
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relevant to a court's analysis of fair use. 69 AB Justice Holmes
explained in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing CO.,70 outside of the most narrow limits, it would be dangerous to have
persons educated only in the law evaluate the worth of a creative work.71
Whether the infringer copied the original in good faith or for
a commercial interest may contribute to the court's understanding of the context of the infringement.72 Any aspect of the
infringer's conduct, including whether the infringer acknowledged the copyright owner or whether the infringer sought
permission, can be considered.73 Acknowledgment of a source,
however, does not excuse infringement when other § 107 factors are present. 74 Additionally when the second work is a parody, the parodist is neither expected to seek nor obtain the
copyright holder's permission.75 Understandably, few authors
would grant permission to have their character or their work
mocked.76
AB part of its analysis under the first factor, a court considers whether the character of the use is of a commercial nature
or is for a nonprofit educational purpose; whether the use was
productive; and whether the alleged infringer's conduct was
proper. 77 The character of the use is of considerable importance, specifically whether the user would profit from the use of
the copyrighted material without paying the customary price
for the use. 78 The fact that an infringement itself may be considered commercial, as opposed to nonprofit, weighs against

69. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582.
70. 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
71. See id. In Campbell, the Supreme Court provided only a few lines of dicta on
the issue of cultural bias, simply reiterating the rule introduced in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing. See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 1015.
72. See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2nd Cir. 1992).
73. See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171,1175-76 (9th Cir. 1992).
74. See id. at 1176 n.8.
.
75. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986).
76. See id.
77. See Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D. Mass. 1993).
78. See Harper & Row Publ'g, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
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fair ~e. 79 In Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios,80 the Supreme
Court recognized a presumption against fair use when the infringing use was based on commercial objectives.s1 Several
years later, in Campbell, the Court held that the commercial
character of a use does not, by itself, bar a finding of fair use.S2
Under the first factor, courts also consider whether the infringing use is transformative.83 In Folsom v. Marsh, Justice
Story defined a new work as transformative if it did not supersede or serve as a market substitute for the original work.84 In
Campbell, the Supreme Court expanded on Justice Story's
definition of "transformative," adopting Justice Leval's interpretation, and indicated that a work would be considered transformative if the secondary work added "something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message. n85 When considering
whether a work is transformative, the Ninth Circuit has assessed whether the purpose for the infringer's use of the copied
material is the same as the intrinsic purpose intended by the
copyright owner.86 When an infringing use is not transformative, it would more than likely supersede the original and market substitution would be more certain.S7 A transformative use
is neither necessary for a finding of fair use, nor is it dispositive
in a fair use determination.88 Instead, courts will consider the
degree to which a secondary work is transformed, and the more

79. See id.
80. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
81. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449. In Sony, the infringing use involved noncommercial reproduction of television shows for re-broadcasting at a later time. See id.
at 417.
82. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
83. See id. at 579.
84. See id. (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D: Mass. 1841)).
85. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (citing Pierre Leval, Toward a Standard of Fair
Use, supra note 25, at 1111).
86. See Marcus, 695 F.2d at 1175.
87. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. Market substitution occurs when the infringing use would be considered a replacement for the original copyrighted work. See id. A
finding that an infringing use superseded the original would impact the court's analysis under the fourth factor, where an effect on the market could be presumed because a
superseding use equates with market substitution. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403.
88. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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transformative it is, the less other factors, such as commercialism, will weigh into the fair use analysis.89

B.

SECOND FACTOR: NATURE OF COPYRIGHTED WORK

In considering the nature of the work, the court recognizes
that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright
protection than others.90 To be copyrightable under § 102, a
work must be an original work of authorship.91 In Feist v. Rural Telephone, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional
requirement for minimal creativity in addition to independent
creation.92 Originality is, therefore, a threshold requirement
for copyright protection.93 As compared to factual works, creative expression falls closer to the core of copyright protection.94
Typically, a fmding of fair use is more likely when the nature of
the copyrighted work is factual rather than fictional or creative. 95 In general, this second factor is much more important
when analyzing a work that does not claim to be social commentary, such as parody.96 Specifically, when considering a
parodic infringement, this factor is less important because
parodies invariably copy publicly-known, expressive works.97
C.

THIRD FACTOR: AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY

Under the third factor, courts analyze the quantity and the
substantiality of the original work used in the infringing
work.98 The first relevant consideration is whether a significant portion of the infringing work was copied from a protected
work. 99 Although a significant amount of copying weighs

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
(1990».
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See id.
See id. at 586. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
See id. at 351.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (citing Stewart v. Abend, 495 U. S. 207, 237-38
See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990).
See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 1006.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564.
See id.
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against a fmding of fair use, taking a lesser portion of the copyrighted work will not necessarily be excused.loo Generally, the
inquiry under this factor is intertwined with that of the first
factor because courts recognize that the extent of permissible
copying will vary with the purpose and character of the use.IOI
Next, courts consider the substantiality of the copying.l02
The concern is whether the infringer took the "heart" of the
original work. loa In Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, the infringer copied passages from President Gerald
Ford's manuscript for his forthcoming book, A Time To Heal. 104
The Supreme Court held that even though the number of words
quoted did not represent a large portion of the original work,
the copied passages "qualitatively embodied [the] distinctive
expression" ofthe work.lo5
Courts also examine whether a substantial portion of a
copyrighted work was copied verbatim. loo Exact copying demonstrates the quality of the copied material, both to the original
author and to the infringer, who seeks to profit from the original author's copyrighted expression. I07 Verbatim copying may
make a quantitatively small infringing use qualitatively
great. IOB
Use of some characteristic features of the original work in a
parody cannot be avoided because both parody's humor and
social comment derive from the public's recognition of the

100. See id. at 565.
101. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87. In Campbell, the Supreme Court remanded
the case, in part, to determine whether appropriation of the original song's classic bass
line was excessive copying. See id. at 589.
102. See id. at 587.
103. See id. In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court considered the infringement of
the Umost powerful passages" as essentially taking the "heart" of the original work.
Harper & Row v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
104. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542.
105. 1d. at 564-65.
106. See id. at 565.
107. See id.
108. See Roy Export Co. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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original's most distinctive or memorable features. 109 When a
parody targets a particular work, the parody must be able to
"conjure up" at least enough of the original so the parodist can
be certain the audience will recognize it.110 Courts have afforded parodists substantial latitude in the amount of copying
allowed. lll Although an infringer must take enough to assure
identification of the copyrighted work, how much more the infringer can reasonably take will depend on the degree to which
the new work's overriding purpose is to parody the original.l12
To be sure, if an infringer borrows so much that it becomes
likely the parody will serve as a market substitute for the
original, the quantity of the use is unreasonable.113
Thus, the facts bearing upon the third factor, amount and
substantiality, are also relevant to the analysis of the fourth
factor. 114 They assist in determining the extent to which the
parody serves as a market substitute for the original or its derivatives.1l5 A finding of market substitution may establish an
inference of market harm. us

D. FOURTH FACTOR: EFFECT ON THE MARKET

An analysis of the fourth factor examines the extent of the
market harm caused by the infringement. l17 As the essence of
copyright protection provides an· economic incentive to the
author, it is critical that the market for the original not be diminished. us Many courts have indicated that the fourth factor
is "undoubtedly the single most important element of fair

109. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
110. See id.
111. See generally Koons, 960 F.2d at 311.
112. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588. The Court indicates that the lower limit of
what is considered reasonable is established by an audience's recognition of the original and recognizes that use of characteristic features is required to accomplish that
goal. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 587.
115. See id.
116. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403.
117. See 17 U.S.C. § 107; supra note 6 and accompanying text.
118. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
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use."1l9 Courts reach this conclusion despite the lack of statutory direction on the matter. 120 The absence of any language to
the contrary may suggest the factors should be balanced
equally, but courts have, in fact, placed a greater weight on this
factor. 121
Market harm may be found when unrestricted and widespread conduct, of the same sort as the infringement under
consideration, would have an adverse impact on the potential
market for the original. 122 In deciding whether the original
work has been harmed, courts focus on whether the infringing
use diminishes the potential sale of the original work, whether
it fulfills the demand for the original work by acting as a market substitute, or whether it interferes with the marketability
of the original work. l23
Fair use, an affirmative defense, requires that the infringer
carry the burden of demonstrating evidence about the relevant
markets, including the market for derivatives. l24 Market harm
may be found upon a showing by a preponderance of the evi-

119. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
120. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107. The
statutory language of § 107 does not indicate how each of the four factors should be
weighted. [d. The observation that the fourth statutory factor "is undoubtedly the
single most important factor" was only dicta in the Harper & Row opinion. See Pierre
Leva!, Essay, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use Rescued, 44 U.C.L.A L. REV. 1449, 1459
(1997). Leval recognizes the fourth factor as significant, but indicates that even where
a secondary use does not harm the market, that infringing use may still not be justified
as a fair use. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1124. The fourth
factor does not overshadow the requirement of justification under the flrBt factor. See
id.
121. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107; supra text accompanying note 6. Each factor directs the court to deliberate on a different facet of the issue. See Toward A Fair Use
Standard, supra note 25, at 1110. Justice Leval indicates that "the factors do not represent a score card that promises victory to the winner of the majority." [d. Instead,
§ 107 directs the court to examine all of the facts and to consider whether a finding of
fair use would serve the goals of copyright. See id.
122. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
123. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1155-56
(9th Cir. 1986).
124. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. In Campbell, the Supreme Court remanded
the case, in part, to provide the parties an opportunity to produce evidence concerning
the effect on the market for a non-parodic rap version of 'Oh, Pretty Woman.' See id. at
593.
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dence that some meaningful likelihood of future harm exists,
which would tend to diminish or prejudice the sales of the
original or derivative works. 125 To successfully challenge a fair
use defense, a plaintiff need only show that if the infringing
use became widespread, it would adversely affect the potential
market for the copyrighted work. 126 In Sony Corp. v. Universal
Studios, the Supreme Court held that non-commercial reproduction of television shows by use of home video cassette taping
did not have a demonstrable effect upon the potential market
for, or the value of, the copyrighted shows.127 The Court's decision turned on the fact that the infringing use had been for a
personal purpose, time shifting to enable the home viewer to
watch a show at a later time, rather than for a commercial
purpose. l28 In addition, because the use was non-commercial
and personal, the Court recognized that prohibition of such reproduction would not protect the author's incentive to create.l29
Thus, when the copy does not compete with the original, the
courts are not concerned about undercutting the demand and
discouraging creativity.130
Courts have acknowledged that, realistically, parodists will
seldom receive permission from the owners of an original work
to create a critical review or to caricature the work.l31 In the
context of fair use, the inability to secure permission to use
copyrighted material in exchange for consideration, financial or
otherwise, constitutes market failure. 132 Market failure commonly occurs where an author attempts or proposes to ridicule

125. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451. Actual harm need not be shown, nor must
there even be a showing that future harm will result with certainty. See id.
126. See id.
127. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 450.
128. See id. at 450-53.
129. See id.
130. See Hustler, 796 F.2d at 1156.
131. See Leibowitz v. Paramount, 948 F. Supp. 1214, 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Accord
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F. 2d 432,
437 (9th Cir. 1986).
132. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1602
(1982). Market failure is impliedly different from market harm, which involves an
adverse impact on the market for the original. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at
591-92.
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another author because the original author's "[s]elf-esteem is
seldom strong enough to permit the granting of permission
even in exchange for a reasonable fee. "133 The fair use defense
exists to allow certain uses, such as parody, which likely cannot
be purchased. 134 In part, the fair use privilege, including its
application to a parodic infringement, exists to advance and
disseminate culture and knowledge. 135
A finding of a commercial purpose, under the first factor, is
indicative of, although not dispositive of, market harm.13S In
Sony, the Supreme Court held that a commercial purpose under the first factor created a presumption against a finding of
fair use. 137 The Campbell Court then narrowly construed the
Sony holding, finding no presumption in a situation involving
something beyond mere duplication for commercial purposes.l38
The Court reasoned that verbatim copying for a commercial use
clearly serves as a market substitute for the original.139 Consequently, in evaluating the impact of the commercial purpose,
a court must consider whether such a purpose interferes with
the author's incentive to create, thus compromising the goals of
copyright law. 140
In contrast, when the infringing use is transformative,
"market substitution is ... less certain and market harm may
not be so readily inferred. "141 As a parody, the new work will
not likely affect the value of the original in a cognizable manner, by acting as a substitute for it, simply because the parody
and the original rarely serve the same market functions. 142 An

133. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437.
134. See id.
135. See Gordon, supra note 132, at 1602. The fair use aflIrmative defense grants
the privilege to use a creator's copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without
the author's consent. See Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303,
306 (2 nd Cir. 1966).
136. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-91.
137. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451.
138. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
139. See id.
140. See generally Twentieth Century, 422 U.S. at 156.
141. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
142. See id.
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illustrative case is Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority,
Inc., in which Jerry Falwell mass reproduced a parody piece
about him, which was originally published in Hustler, a wellknown pornographic magazine. 143 Falwell's purpose was threefold: to rebut Hustler's personal attack; to make a political
comment on pornography; and to solicit funds for his
ministry.l44 Clearly Falwell's audience was different from Hustler's audience. 145 In addition, the "commercial" purposes of
each use differed: Hustler used the parody in a for-profit context, while Falwell's use served a non-profit purpose.l46 As a
result, the Ninth Circuit found Falwell's reproduction a fair
use. 147

It is conceivable that a parody may harm the original work's
market, just as a scathing review may suppress demand for a
book, movie, or theatrical production.l48 Courts differentiate,
however, between remediable displacement, copyright infringement that usurps the original, and unremediable disparagement, biting criticism that merely suppresses demand for
the original. 149 Market substitution is indicative of market
harm and suggests remediable displacement, such that the
copyright holder should be afforded a legal remedy.150
Courts recognize, however, that a parody may simply be a
form of unremediable disparagement, making its parodic point
by criticizing or commenting on another work.l5l Courts reason
that, by employing distortion and exaggeration and evoking
amusement, derision, or scorn, a parody results in a form of
disparagement that does not necessarily entitle an author to a
remedy.152 It is not relevant under copyright law that a parody

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See Hustler, 796 F. 2d at 1149-50.
See id. at 1153.
See id. at 1150, 1156.
See id. at 1156.
See id.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92.
See id. at 592.
See id.
Dorsen, supra note 61, at 952.
See id. at 952-53.
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may impair the market for the original or its derivative works
through the effect of its critical commentary.l53 Such impairment is not market harm, but merely constitutes unremediable
disparagement. 154
IV.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

Penguin appealed the district court's grant of a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the publication of The Cat NOT in the
Hat!15S The Ninth Circuit then reviewed whether Seuss Enterprises had made a sufficient showing of copyright infringement,
and if so, whether that infringement constituted a fair use.15S

A.

PuRPoSE AND CHARACTER OF USE

The court first evaluated whether The Cat NOT in the Hat!
had a purpose and character that satisfied the meaning of
§ 107. 157 In accordance with Campbell, the Ninth Circuit began
by thoroughly deliberating the purpose of the infringement and
considering whether the work was a parody.l58 The court recognized that, under Campbell, in order to be considered a fair
use, The Cat NOT in the Hat! must be a parody rather than a

153. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 593.
154. See id. at 592-93. If, however, there is substantial goodwill associated with a
famous trademark, disparagement may be remediable under a claim of dilution if the
parody tarnishes the trademark by portraying it in an unwholesome or unsavory way.
See Leslie J. Lott and Brett M. Hutton, Trademark Parody, 489 PLIIPat 517, 528
(1997).
155. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396
(9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3170 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1997) (No. 97-329)
(MSeuss Ir) The district court granted the preliminary injunction on the basis that
Seuss Enterprises demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its copyright
infringement claim and that the balance of the hardships weighed in favor of Seuss
Enterprises. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559,
1575 (S.D. Cal. 1996). (MSeuss r)
156. See Seu88 II, 109 F.3d at 1397. Penguin's request for reconsideration presented the Ninth Circuit with a number of questions about the lower court's decision.
See Defs.' Opening Br., at 2, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d
1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). First, Penguin contended the district court erred
by preliminarily enjoining publication of the book. See id. Second, Penguin asserted
the scope of the district court's preliminary injunction was overbroad in that it enjoined
non-infringing material. See id.
157. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
158. See generally SeusslI, 109 F.3d at 1399-1400.
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satire. 159 To be recognized as a parody, the new work must at
least, in part, comment on the original author's work. 1so The
court discussed Rogers v. Koons, in which the Second Circuit
emphasized that the original work must be the target, in part,
of the parody, otherwise the new work is only a satire.l61 The
Ninth Circuit, however, found the standard expressed in Justice Kennedy's Campbell concurrence more persuasive. l62 Justice Kennedy stated that "the parody must target the original,
and not just its general style, the genre of art to which it belongs, or society as a whole (although if it targets the original,
it may target those features as well). »163 This more restrictive
standard requires that a parody target both the style and the
substance of an original. l64
The Ninth Circuit found that neither the substance nor the
content of The Cat in the Hat was conjured up by the infringing
work's focus on the Brown and Goldman murders and the O.J.
Simpson trial. l65 The Ninth Circuit examined various portions

159. See id. at 1400-01.
160. See id. In parody, the copyrighted work is the target, whereas in satire, the
copyrighted work is merely a vehicle to poke fun at another target. See id. at 1400.
Courts do not recognize the fair use defense for a satire. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d 1394
(9th Cir. 1997) (infringing book was only satire and may not be afforded latitude in fair
use defense); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310, 312 (2nd Cir. 1992) (infringing sculpture not entitled to fair use defense because only commented on materialistic society
and not the original photograph); Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (1956), affd Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (holding burlesque, a form of
satire, not defensible on grounds affair use).
161. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1400-01. For a parody to be recognized as such, the
Second Circuit required that the audience must recognize an original and separate
expression attributable to a different author. See Koons, 960 F.2d at 310.
162. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1400. Justice Kennedy's concurrence provides that a secondary work made for profit, no matter how transformative, is not a fair
use unless it displays a parodic character. See Roxana Badin, An Appropriate(d) Place
in Transformative Value: Appropriation Art's Exclusion form Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1653, 1654 (1995).
163. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1400 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597). (emphasis
added). Besides requiring that a parody target the original work's style and substance,
Justice Kennedy also "cautioned against allowing copiers to claim parody status as an
afterthought." See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 992.
164. See generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 597 (1994).
165. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401.
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of The Cat NOT in the Hat! and concluded that it was not a
parody, but simply a retelling of the Simpson tale.l66
The first two pages focus on Los Angeles, California, specifically Brentwood, the site of the two brutal murders.167 The
following section mimics Dr. Seuss' poem "One Fish Two Fish
Red Fish Blue Fish" with the stanza "One Knife? Two Knife?
Red Knife Dead Wife. "168 The next eighteen pages detail Simpson's trip to Chicago, the noise outside Kato Kaelin's room, the
bloody glove found by detective Mark Fuhrman, the Bronco
automobile chase, the Dream Team of lawyers, the jury selection, the DNA evidence and more. 169
The court concluded that the infringing work broadly mimicked Dr. Seuss' characteristic style, but it did not ridicule that
style. 170 The court noted that Penguin's use of the Cat's stovepipe hat, Dr. Juice as a narrator, and a title similar to the
original's title were all means of drawing attention to the new
work, perhaps "to avoid the drudgery in working up something
fresh."171
Finally, with regard to the purpose and character of use, the
Ninth Circuit considered whether The Cat NOT in the Hat!
merely superseded the Dr. Seuss originals or whether it "transformed" those works. 172 The court did not recognize any effort
to create a transformative work. 173 As a result, under the first
factor, the court concluded the scale tipped against fair use be-

166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. Seeid.
170. See Seu88 II, 109 F.3d at 1401.
171. ld. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580).
172. See Seus8 II, 109 F.3d at 1400. A work is "transformative" if it adds newexpression, meaning or message. See id.
173. See id. at 1401.
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cause the infringing work was neither a parody nor transformative. I74
B. NATURE OF COPYRIGHTED WORK

The second factor requires that the court consider the nature of the original copyrighted work. 175 Creative works are
generally afforded the highest level of protection in a claim of
copyright infringement.176 The Ninth Circuit recognized that
the original work, The Cat in the Hat, embodied significant
creativity, imagination, and originality.I77 Consistent with
prior case analysis on this factor, the court did not find this
factor to be significant in the fair use determination.I78 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the second factor also tilted
the scale against fair use. 179
C. AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY

Under the third factor, the Ninth Circuit questioned
whether the amount and substantiality of the portion of the
original used, in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,
was reasonable in light of the purpose for the copying.lSO First,
when considering the quality of the appropriation, the Ninth
Circuit indicated that this factor raised the question of substantial similarity rather than fair use. l8l The court had previously discussed substantial similarity when it considered
whether there was an infringement of Seuss Enterprises' copyright. 182 The Ninth Circuit emphasized Penguin's appropria-

174. See id. The district court considered both parody and satire as transformative
and indicated that neither posed a threat of displacing the demand for the original
work. See SeussI, 924 F. Supp. at 1568.
175. See 17 U,S.C. § 107 (2); supra note 6 and accompanying text.
176. See Seuss11, 109 F.3d at 1402 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
177. See SeussII, 109 F.3d at 1402.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See Seuss 11, 109 F.3d at 1402. In considering whether there was a copyright
infringement, the Ninth Circuit evaluated whether Seuss Enterprises had demonstrated substantial similarity. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1398. The court applied a
version of the two part test presented in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
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tion of the Cat's image, the copying of the Cat's hat, and the
multiple uses of the image on the front and back covers and in
the text as evidence ofinfringement. l83 Reflecting on the qualitative nature of the copying, the court concluded that the Cat's
image represented the "highly expressive core" of Dr. Seuss'
work. 184
Second, in examining the quantity of the appropriation, the
Ninth Circuit considered the extent of permissible copying relative to the purpose and character of the use. l85 When courts
recognize an infringing work as a parody, there is substantial
latitude in the amount of copying allowed. l86 Despite its previous determination that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was not a
parody, the Ninth Circuit reexamined the issue.187
Katz and Wrinn, the authors of The Cat NOT in the Hat!,
argued that they selected The Cat in the Hat as the vehicle for
their parody because the two stories were similar.l88 Specifically, the authors pointed out that the main characters of each
tale, the Cat and O.J. Simpson, each committed acts contrary
to moral authority and both stories end with a significant
moral dilemma. 189 In The Cat in the Hat, the children must
decide whether to tell their mother about the Cat's visit.l90 In
The Cat NOT in the Hat!, Penguin maintained that a similar

McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). See id. at 1398. The test inquires
first whether the works are substantially similar in both idea and expression, and
second whether an audience of reasonable persons would perceive substantial similarities between the infringing work and the protected expression of the original work. See
id.
183. See Seuss 11, 109 F.3d at 1402. The image was used thirteen separate times.
See id.
184. Id.
185. See id. The extent of permissible copying is evaluated based on the persuasiveness of the parodist'sjustification for the copying. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
186. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87.
187. See SeussII, 109 F.3d at 1402-03.
188. See id. at 1402.
189. See id.
190. Seeid.
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moral dilemma existed, concerning the revelation of the actual
murderer's identity.191
Penguin argued that its work was a commentary on the
events surrounding the Brown and Goldman murders. l92 By
evoking the world of The Cat in the Hat, the authors felt they
could "comment on the mix of frivolousness and moral gravity
ijuxtaposed by] the culture's reaction to the events surrounding
the ... murders."193 Moreover, the authors relied on Dr. Seuss'
combination of whimsy and moral dilemma to recall The Cat in
the Hat, where a trickster Cat created "mayhem along with his
friends, Thing One and Thing Two, and then magically
clean[ed] it up ... leaving a moral dilemma in his wake."l94
Similarly, The Cat NOT in the Hat! presented a scenario in
which the trickster O.J. Simpson created mayhem that his
friends, Kato Kaelin and Simpson's Dream Team of lawyers
magically cleaned up, leaving a moral dilemma about the identity of the murderer. 195 The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed
with the lower court's characterization of Penguin's claim to
fair use as "purely schtick," stating Penguin's post-hoc characterization of the work as a parody was "completely unconvincing."l96 Thus, the court's finding under the third factor also
weighed against fair use. l97

D.

EFFECT ON THE MARKET

Finally, the Ninth Circuit turned its attention to the fourth
factor, and evaluated the extent of market harm that publica-

191. See id.
192. See Seu88 II, 109 F.~ at 1402.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1402-03.
195. See id.
196. Id. at 1403. The lower court compared the parodic nature of Th£ Cat NOT in
th£ Hat! to the parodic nature of the secondary use in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S.
569 (1994), Fish£r v. Dee8, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986), and Elsmere Music v. National
Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1980). See SeU88 I, 924 F. Supp. at 1569. The
district court found no similar attempt to comment on the text or themes of Th£ Cat in
th£ Hat. See id. The court found Penguin's assertion that The Cat NOT in th£ Hatf
achieved its status as parody by "suggesting limits to the Seussian imagination" to be
inadequate and unconvincing. Id.
197. See Seussll, 109 F.3d at 1403.
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tion and distribution of The Cat NOT in the Hat! would
cause. 19B The court fIrst considered whether unrestricted and
widespread dissemination of the infringing work would harm
the potential market for the original and its derivatives.l99
The Ninth Circuit recognized that substantial good will and
reputation is associated with Dr. Seuss' works.2OO Based on its
prior conclusion that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was nontransformative and commercial, the court inferred market
harm because market substitution was more certain.201
In addition, Penguin failed to demonstrate any evidence regarding the relevant markets. 202 Relying on Campbell, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that it could not analyze the fourth
factor, but could only recognize that a silent record on a such
an important fair use factor "disentitle[s] the proponent to the
defense. "203
In light of its fair use analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that
this fourth factor, along with factors one, two and three,
weighed against a fInding of fair use.204 Consequently, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's preliminary injunc-

198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See id.
201. See id. The district court was less willing to infer market harm. See Seus8 I,
924 F.Supp. at 1568. The district court found that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was only
satire, but indicated that both parody and satire were transformative works. See id. As
a transformative work, the court stated it did not seem likely that the new work would
displace demand for the original. See id. The district court also discussed an original
author's likely reluctance to license parodies, relying on Fisher v. Dee8. See id. The
court concluded that since a parodist seldom gets permission, a parodist is "presumed
to operate within a market imperfection." Id.
202. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403.
203. Id. at 1403 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94). In Campbell, the defendants submitted uncontroverted evidence that there was no likely effect on the market
for the original. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. The defendants failed, however, to
address the market for derivatives. See id. The Supreme Court recognized that the
defendants' lack of evidence on the market effect on derivatives did not necessitate a
conclusion of market effect. See id. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings with an expectation that "the evidentiary hole will doubtless be plugged upon
remand." Id. at 594.
204. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403.
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tion, thus prohibiting Penguin from distributing or marketing
The Cat NOT in the HatP05

v.

CRITIQUE

In Seuss Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit narrowly interpreted
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music206 and produced a result that is
inconsistent with that decision, as well as prior Ninth Circuit
jurisprudence.207 First, while examining the purpose and character of the infringing use, the Ninth Circuit found that parody
was not the purpose of The Cat NOT in the Hatf OS The court
found that the work only targeted society in general, rather
than The Cat in the Hat specifically, and concluded The Cat
NOT in the Hat! was a satire.209
In determining whether Penguin was entitled to the fair use
defense, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Campbell decision. 210
In Campbell, the Supreme Court considered whether a rap
group's use of a famous pop song was a fair one.211 The Court
methodically explored each of the four factors set forth in § 107
in light of the goals of copyright.212 The Campbell opinion provides the lower courts with guidance in determining whether a
derivative work is a parody and whether it is entitled to the
fair use defense.213

205. See id. at 1406.
206. 510 u.s. 569 (1994). Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music is the most recent precedent for copyright infringement by an alleged parody. See id.
207. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 3, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 580-83 (1994) (perceiving parody where secondary work targets original
work, at least in part); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (perceiving
parody where comedic objective of infringement was related to the original work).
208. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401
(9th Cir. 1997) ("Seuss Ir).
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1400.
211. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569.
212. See generally id. at 575-94. The Court did not actually conclude there had
been fair use; instead, the case was remanded for further proceedings. See id. at 59394.
213. See generally id. at 578-84.
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By declaring The Cat NOT in the Hat! not a parody, the
Ninth Circuit unnecessarily narrowed the Campbell holding. 214
In Campbell, the Supreme Court was willing to recognize that
a work that more loosely targets the original may be sufficiently aimed at the original to be a parody.215 The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Campbell set a precedent that is likely
to have a chilling effect on the creation of social and political
criticism. 216
In addition, under the first factor, the Ninth Circuit found
no effort to create a trans formative work. 217 Although, the
court examined this subfactor, its analysis suggests that a determination of whether the new work was transformative was
dependent on whether the new work was a parody.218 As parody is not the only category of work that may be considered
transformative, the court should have clarified under what circumstances a new work will be sufficiently changed with new
message, meaning or expression to constitute a transformative
work. 219 The court should also have presented an analysis regarding whether The Cat NOT in the Hat! superseded the
original work. 220
After fmding that the first factor weighed against a finding
of fair use, the court went on to evaluate the remaining
factors. 221 While considering the second factor, the nature of
the original copyrighted work, the court recognized that creative works, rather than factual works, are closer to the core of
copyright protection.222 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit did not
afford The Cat NOT in the Hat! any protection under this fac-

214. See SeusslI, 109 F.3d at 1401. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-82.
215. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81, n.14.
216. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 3, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619).
217. See Seussll, 109 F.3d at 1401.
218. See id. at 1400-01.
219. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
220. See generally SeusslI, 109 F.3d at 1399-1401.
221. See id. at 1401-03.
222. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586; supra note 30, 91 and accompanying text.
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tor because the original work embodied significant creativity,
imagination and originality.223
In examining the third factor, whether the quantity or
quality of the appropriated material was reasonable, the court
considered that the extent of copying allowed under fair use
depends upon the derivative work's purpose.224 The court
found that the heart, "the highly expressive core" of the original, was taken and that this factor also weighed against a
finding of fair use. 225 The court's analysis, however, was influenced by its earlier conclusion that the secondary use was not
parody.226
In considering the fourth factor, whether there was an adverse effect on the market, the court inferred market harm because the secondary use was both non-transformative and
commercia1. 227 The court, however, failed to analyze the subfactors typically evaluated under an inquiry into the market
effect. 228 A proper inquiry examines: (1) the likelihood of substitution for the original; (2) the harm to derivatives unexcused
by market failure; and (3) the harm to the original other than
unremediable disparagement.229 The fair use doctrine strives
to allow use of original material for the public's benefit, so long
as that use does not interfere with the economic interests of the
author.230 Had the court fully considered each of these subfactors, it should have found that The Cat NOT in the Hat! was
protected by fair use. 231

A. PERCEMNG A PARODY
When considering a parodist's claim to fair use, a court
must first determine if an infringer's work meets the threshold
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402.
See id. at 1402-03.
Id.
See generally id. at 1401.
See id. at 1403.
See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-92.
See Dorsen, supra note 61, at 961.
See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94.
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requirement for the defense: "whether a parodic character may
reasonably be perceived. >7232 Courts have recognized parody as
a work containing a discernible direct comment on the
original. 233 Although the Ninth Circuit conceded Penguin's
work did broadly mimic Dr. Seuss' style, it concluded that the
work was not a parody because The Cat NOT in the Hat! did
not target the "substance" of the original work.234
In analyzing whether The Cat NOT in the Hat! was a parody, the Ninth Circuit presented the Campbell threshold test
as if it intended to follow it.235 The Campbell Court would discern a parody when a new work could reasonably be perceived
as having a parodic character and, at least, in part, comments
on the prior author's works. 236 The Ninth Circuit, however,
elected to follow a stricter test outlined in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, which requires a parody to target the substance of
the original as well as its general style. 237 , The Ninth Circuit
considered The Cat NOT in the Hat! to be merely a retelling of
the O.J. Simpson saga with no direct comment on The Cat in
the Hat. 238 On the basis that the infringing work did not mimic
both the original's style and substance, the court found The Cat
NOT in the Hat! to be merely a satire.239 Thus, The Cat NOT
in the Hat! required justification for any borrowing because

232. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1400 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582).
233. See Seuss I, 924 F. Supp. at 1569. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583 (finding rap version of"Oh Pretty Woman" commented ,on the naivete of the original, which ignored the
ugliness of street life); Fisher, 794 F.2d at 436. (finding parody in infringing song,
"When Sonny Sniffs Glue," which mocked both the lyrics of "When Sunny Gets Blue;
and the original singer's vocal range); Leibowitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 948 F.
Supp. 1214, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding parodic effect achieved by contrasting majestic pregnant woman and absurd-looking pregnant man); Elsmere Music, Inc. v. Nat'l
Broad. Co. 482 F. Supp. 741, 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd 623 F.2d 252 (2nd Cir. 1980)
(finding parody in song, "I Love Sodom," that mocked original song, "I Love New York,"
and city's advertising campaign).
234. Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401.
235. See id. at 1400.
236. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580, 582.
237. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1400 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597).
238. See Suess II, 510 U.S. at 1401.
239. See id.
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satire does not share parody's protection under the fair use doctrine. 240
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Seuss Enterprises is not consistent with the Campbell decision. 241 In Campbell, a rap
group substituted shocking lyrics for the original, "Oh, Pretty
Woman," to show the banality of the Roy Orbison and William
Dees song.242 The Supreme Court found that the rap song "juxtapose[d] the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes
true, with degrading taunts, [and] a bawdy demand for sex.~43
The Court accepted these taunts as commentary on the naivete
of the original, which ignored the realities and ugliness of
street life.244 Although the Supreme Court was unwilling to
assign a high rank of parodic element to the rap song, it nevertheless recognized the song could reasonably be perceived as
commenting to some degree on the origina1.245
Similarities exist between the secondary works in Campbell
and Seuss Enterprises. 246 In both cases, the new works share a
significant main character with the infringing work; the intruder in Seuss Enterprises and the "pretty woman" in Campbell. 247 In both instances, the copier took highly recognizable
material to "conjure up" the target of their parody.248 The secondary works both commented on society and the naivete of the
original work.249 Although The Cat in the Hat characterized

240. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81.
241. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 3, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569;
Seuss II, 109 F.3d 1394.
242. See Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F. Supp. 1150, 1155 (M.D. Tenn.
1991) ("Acuff-Rose").
243. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
244. Seeid.
245. See id.
246. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569; Seuss 11, 109 F.3d 1394.
247. See Seuss 11, 109 F.3d at 1402; Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1155.
248. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 573; Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401.
249. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583; Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. The
authors of The Cat NOT in the Hat! suggest they relied on the original Seuss work in a
way to expose the real trickster "cat", a.k.a. O.J. Simpson, who creates chaos and miraculously cleans it up, "leaving a moral dilemma in its wake." See Seuss II, 109 F.3d
at 1402-1403. In contrast, in Campbell, the Supreme Court recognized parody in the
mockery of the simplicity of"Oh, Pretty Woman." See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 960.
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the gullibility of the children and their mother and The Cat
NOT in the Hat! characterized the dupability prevalent within
the justice system, the Ninth Circuit rejected the idea that The
Cat NOT in the Hat! commented on the naivete of the
original. 250
In both secondary works, there was a significant departure
from the original in the content and storyline.251 For example,
in Campbell, the emphasis was no longer on a "pretty woman,"
but instead on a "hairy woman," a "bald headed woman," and a
"two timin' woman."252 Similarly, in Seuss Enterprises, the
story diverged from mischief and general mayhem to murder
and legal tricks. 253 Just as the Supreme Court reasonably perceived a parodic character for "Oh Pretty Woman" in Campbell,
so could the Ninth Circuit have perceived such a character for
The Cat NOT in the Hat! in Seuss Enterprises. 254
Despite Penguin's claim that its work was a commentary on
the events surrounding the Brown/Goldman murders, the court
found the infringing work was not a parody.255 Concededly, it

250. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. Both books end with a dilemma about whether
the truth shall be known. See id. For the ending of The Cat in the Hat, see supra note
1 and accompanying text. The Cat NOT in the Hat! ends with the refrain:
Hmm ... take the word JUICE.
Then add ST.
Between the U and I, you see.
And then you have JUSTICE.
Or maybe you don't.
Maybe we will.
And maybe we won't.
Cause if the cat didn't do it?
Then who? Then who?
Was it him?
Was it her?
Was it me?
Was it you?
Ohme! Ohmy!
Ohmy! Ohme!
The murderer is running free.
Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402.
251. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401; Campbell, 510 U.S. at Appendix A, B.
252. Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1155.
253. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402.
254. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583.
255. See Seuss 11,109 F.3d at 1402-03.
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is not sufficient to conclude a work is a parody based solely on
the author's claim. An author's intent, however, should be
taken into account.256 Here, the Ninth Circuit did not accept
the authors' assertion that they selected The Cat in the Hat as
the vehicle for their parody because of the similarities between
the two stories. 257 The authors argued that the two murder
victims were surprised by O.J. Simpson, who committed acts
contrary to moral authority.258 The authors pointed out the
similarity to The Cat in the Hat's storyline, where the two children were surprised by the Cat, who also committed acts contrary to moral authority.259 This connection could reasonably
be perceived as targeting the substance of the origina1.260
In addition, according to the authors, in The Cat NOT in the
Hat!, a defense team of lawyers seemed to impose "tricks" on a
largely unwilling public, much like Things One and Two imposed tricks on the unwilling children in The Cat in the Hat. 261
The resulting verdict, acquitting O.J. Simpson, astonished a
substantial segment of the public, just as The Cat in the Hat's
readers are astonished after the children and the Cat get away
with the mischief of the afternoon.262 This similarity could be
reasonably perceived as targeting the substance, in addition to
the style, of the origina1.263 Finally, the authors contended both
books ended with a moral dilemma: whether the public would
be told about the identity of the victims' visitor(s) and whether
the mother would ever learn about the children's visitors.264
Although the horror of what transpired in the Brown/Goldman
murders is incomparable to the simple mischief that occurred
in The Cat in the Hat, the court should have balanced the
authors' intent, along with their success or lack thereof in

256. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
257. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403.
258. See id. at 1402.
259. See id.
260. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.
261. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402. Public opinion on the verdict in the Simpson
trial was sharply divided, often along racial and gender lines. See Mueller, supra note
15, at 741.
262. See Henry J. Reske, Verdict On Simpson Trial, 81 A.BA J. 48 (Nov. 1995).
263. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-83.
264. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402.
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creating a parody, and reasonably perceived a parodic character.265
Whether a parody is in good or bad taste should not affect
the court's analysis. 266 In reality, however, it may be a factor in
reaching a decision on fair use. Frequently, when a parody attacks a time-honored pop icon, or where an attack is sexually
explicit, courts have found no fair use. 267 Thus, a determination of no fair use is more likely when the parody is offensive
and transgresses the accepted norms of taste and decency.268 A
parody is often considered offensive "when there is a cultural
gulf separating the maker and the object of the parody.Jtl69 In
Campbell, the Court did not deny a finding of fair use despite
the parody's explicit sexual language.27o The distinction may
be that the pop song, u~h, Pretty Woman," is not as venerated,
in the court's eyes, as classical children's characters, such as
those found in the Disney and Seuss works.271
In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, the defendants
also targeted an adult audience by featuring well-known chil-

265. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
266. See id. at 582.
267. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569 (finding raucous rap group's song taking
off from romantic pop song is candidate for fair use defense because it may reasonably
be perceived as a parody and at least, in part, comments on the original work); Seuss
II, 109 F.3d 1394 (rejecting as social commentary on "trial of the century" for two brutal and vicious murders using classic children's book character and not considering
work a parody); Fisher, 794 F.2d 432 (finding raucous song relying on romantic pop
song a parody); MeA v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2nd eir. 1981) (rejecting sexually explicit
song based on pop song as parody); Elsmere Music Inc., 623 F.2d 252 (finding satiric
skit performed to tune of public relation campaign parody); Walt Disney Productions v.
Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th eir. 1978) (finding sexually explicit portrayals of classic
children's cartoon characters in counter culture comic book not fair use where copying
was more exact than necessary for parodist's purposes).
268. See supra note 267.
269. Jacobson, supra note 58, at 1017. In making any subjective interpretation,
such as whether a work constitutes a parody, the court is susceptible to making an
aesthetic judgment, rather than a legal one, due to the "cultural gulf' in the relative
perspectives of the court and the infringer. See generally id. at 1017-20.
270. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 582.
271. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569; Seuss II, 109 F.3d 1394; Air Pirates, 581
F.2d at 753. In Air Pirates, the classic Disney characters were portrayed as promiscuous, drug ingesting members of the counter culture. See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 75253. In Seuss Enterprises, the classic eat was portrayed as a murderer. See Seuss I,
924 F. Supp. at 1561.
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dren's characters.272 The court concluded that the Disney copyrights were infringed; however, the court based its legal conclusion solely on the rule that excessive copying precludes fair
use, and not on a consideration of whether there was market
harm. 273 Theoretically, the new work created a potential negative market effect for the original by skewing the adult public's
view.274 Although the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity in both
Seuss Enterprises and Air Pirates to comment on the impact of
such unremediable disparagement, neither opinion reflected
such consideration.275 In either case, criticism would not be
recognized as a cognizable harm under copyright law.276
B. PARODY VERSUS SATIRE
In contrast to satire, the fair use doctrine affords a parody
greater latitude throughout the fair use analysis.277 For example, the nature of the original copyrighted work would be considered less important because parody inevitably copies wellknown expressive works. 278 The quantity and quality of an infringer's appropriation would be evaluated on a sliding scale,
depending on the degree to which the infringer's overriding
purpose was to parody the origina1.279 Moreover, if the court
recognized the infringing work as a parody, market harm
would be unlikely since few authors grant permission to have
their work ridiculed, even with financial consideration.280 Finally, given the transformative nature of a parody, a court
would be less likely to infer market substitution and, therefore,
less likely to conclude market harm had occurred.281 Thus, a
finding of a parodic character under the first factor carries with

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 752-53.
See id. at 751.
See id. at 758.
See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d 1394; Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591-92.
See id. at 579-81.
See id. at 586.
See id. at 588.
See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437-38.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
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it a certain amount of breathing space in a court's deliberations
on the remaining factors. 282
Here, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the purpose of The
Cat NOT in the Hat! was not parody, but satire, impacted the
court's analysis under each of the remaining fair use factors.283
Although the nature of the copyrighted work is typically not
given much weight in a fair use analysis, it is even less important in cases of parodic infringement, because "parodies almost
invariably copy publicly known expressive works. ~84 Any protection a parody may have gained under the second factor was
lost in Seuss Enterprises, even though the Ninth Circuit indicated this factor would not be significant in the court's overall
fair use analysis. 285
Despite considering this factor less significant in the fair
use balancing, the court found that the degree of creativity and
imagination embodied in The Cat in the Hat weighed against a
finding of fair use. 286 In Campbell, the Supreme Court concluded that parody depends upon a recognition of the original's
most distinctive or memorable features, which, more often than
not, are the original's most creative expression.287 Thus, this
factor becomes less important when considering the fair use
defense in connection with a parody.288 Had the Ninth Circuit
concluded under the first factor that the new work was a parody, rather than a satire, then it may not have concluded that
the second factor weighed against a finding of fair use.289
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit's analysis under the third factor depended upon its conclusion under the first.290 Under the

282. See id. at 578-94.
283. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1399-1403. The court reached this conclusion because the infringer only targeted the style, and not the substance, of the original
work. See id. at 1401.
284. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
285. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402.
286. See id.
287. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-88.
288. See id. at 586.
289. See generally id.
290. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402.
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third factor, the inquiry is whether the amount and substantiality of the portion used, in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole, are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying. 291 The Ninth Circuit noted that Penguin appropriated the
Cat's image multiple times, copying the Cat's hat and using the
image on the front and back covers and thirteen times in the
text. 292 Regarding the qualitative nature of the infringement,
the court found there was no doubt that the Cat's image represented the highly expressive core of Dr. Seuss' work.293
When parody takes aim at a particular work, the parody
must be able to "conjure up" enough of the original so the parodist can be certain the audience will recognize it.294 Once
enough has been appropriated to insure recognition, how much
can be reasonably taken will depend on the degree to which the
overriding purpose is to parody the original or to create a substitute for it.295
Although there is no bright line rule for determining the
amount necessary to conjure up an original, prior decisions
provide guidance. In Leibowitz v. Paramount,296 the lower
court found a parodic work that featured a smirking man's
head atop a pregnant women's body constituted fair use.297 The
"heart" of the original photograph featured a well-known actress, Demi Moore, pregnant, with an expression of fulfillment,
serenity, and pride.298 When considering parody, the inquiry is
not solely whether the "heart" of the original is taken, since it
is the "heart" that ensures an audience will recognize an original. 299 Although, in this case, the infringing work copied the
"heart" of the original, incorporating Leibowitz's lighting and

291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402.
See id.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
See id.
948 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See generally id. at 1215.
See id. at 1222-24.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89.
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backdrop, the court found the amount of copying was reasonable because the overriding purpose was to parody the
original.300

In The Cat NOT in the Hat!, the court emphasized that
Penguin appropriated the Cat's stovepipe hat with five alternating dark and light stripes.301 The characters, the Cat in the
Hat and the caricature of O.J. Simpson, wear the striped hat
and share similar expressions.302 Each character has a long
neck, narrow shoulders, and a facial expression with upraised
eyebrows and a closed lip smile.3°S Penguin elected to use a
caricature of O.J. Simpson wearing the striped, stovepipe hat,
only as frequently as necessary to insure identification of the
prankish cat. 304 The appropriation of the original in both Leibowitz and Seuss Enterprises was merely sufficient to fulfill the
parodic requirement of recognition.305
In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, the Ninth Circuit
considered an infringement that asserted fair use of several
Disney characters.3OO The Air Pirates comic book featured wellknown Disney characters as free-thinking, promiscuous, drugingesting members of a counter culture.307 The Ninth Circuit
identified three factors for determining whether the appropriation was excessive: (1) the degree of public recognition of the
original work, (2) the focus of the parody, and (3) the ease of
conjuring up the original work.3°S The first two factors taken

300. See Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1225.
301. See Seu88 I, 924 F. Supp. at 1564.
302. See id.; Defs.' Opening Br., at 14, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619).
303. See Seu88 1,924 F. Supp. at 1564.
304. See Defs.' Opening Brief, at 14, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619); Seus8 II, 109 F.3d at 1407-08, Attachments 1, 2.
305. See generally Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. 1225; Seus8 II, 109 F.3d 1394. In Leibowitz, there was a single image parodied with another single image. See Leibowitz, 948
F. Supp. 1225. In Seu88 Enterprise8, Penguin appropriated the Cat's image thirteen
times in the text, though not on every page, whereas the Cat appeared in nearly every
illustration in The Cat in the Hat. See SeUS8 II, 109 F.3d at 1402.
306. See generally Air Pirate8, 581 F.2d at 753.
307. See id.
308. See Fisher, 794 F.3d at 439 (citing Air Pirate8, 581 F.2d at 757-58.)
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together indicate that how much more copying is necessary for
a successful claim of fair use depends on the degree to which
the parody targets the origina1.309 In Air Pirates, the Ninth·
Circuit found no· fair use, but solely because the copying had
been more exact then necessary for the parodist's purpose.310
The Ninth Circuit specifically commented that the Disney
characters are well known to the public and a viable alternative to exact copying existed because a recognizable caricature
would be relatively easy to draw.3ll
Although the Ninth Circuit did not distinguish Air Pirates
in its Seuss Enterprises opinion, the copying of the hat in Seuss
Enterprises was not exact and more importantly, the stovepipe
hat rests upon a caricature of O.J. Simpson, rather than atop a
caricature of the Cat.312 Whereas the Ninth Circuit deemed the
copying of the Disney characters to have no other purpose than
to track Disney's work as closely as possible, in Seuss Enterprises, the illustrator made a bona-fide attempt to use only as
much as was necessary to conjure up the origina1.313 The relevant illustration in The Cat NOT in the Hat! is based on the
original, but it is a caricature of O.J. Simpson.314 In balancing
the scope of the copying with the degree of targeting the original work, the court should have concluded that The Cat NOT in
the Hat! was entitled to the fair use defense because it only appropriated as much as necessary to ensure identification.315
Another inquiry under the quality and quantity analysis is
the persuasiveness of the parodist's justification for the
taking. 316 In accordance with Campbell, the Ninth Circuit
"recognize[d] the extent of the permissible copying varies with
the purpose and character of the use.'J317 In Campbell, both the

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
See Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 758.
See id. at 757-58.
See supra note 304.
See generally Air Pirates, 581 F.2d at 757-58; Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1397.
See supra note 304.
See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89.
See id. at 586.
Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
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original song and the infringing work focused on the physical
attributes of their female main character.3lS The new song
copied the opening lyrics and repeated one of its bass riffS.319
Then, it departed markedly from the song's lyrics for its own
purpose and included distinctive sounds, various noises, overlaid solos in different keys, and a different drum beat.32o
Similarly, in Seuss Enterprises, the new book copied the Cat's
stovepipe hat, pose, and facial expression, and some of its poetic rhythm, but then departed markedly with the new content,
retelling the story of an infamous double murder and the ensuing trial. 321 The Ninth Circuit could have found that the
quantity and quality of the appropriated material were consistent with the infringer's parodic intent.322
C. TRANSFORMATIVE USE AS FAIR USE

The Ninth Circuit also found Penguin's use of The Cat in the
Hat non-transformative based on its conclusion that Penguin
made no effort to incorporate "new expression, meaning, or
message" into the secondary work.323 As a result, because
market substitution was more certain, the court was willing to
infer market harm under the fourth factor. 324 The Ninth Circuit, in its failure to analyze what would constitute "new expression, meaning, or message," at the very least, missed an
opportunity to clarify the nature of a transformative work.
This consideration was important because if The Cat NOT in
the Hat! was transform ative , the first factor may not have
weighed against fair use, despite the commercial character of
the infringing work.325 Additionally, market substitution
would be less certain and market harm might have been less
readily inferred.326 Consequently, had the Ninth Circuit con-

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326..

See generally Acuff-Rose, 754 F. Supp. at 1155.
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589.
See id.
See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402; Seuss I, 924 F. Supp. at 1564.
See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 566-89.
See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1401.
See id.
See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403.
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cluded the new work was transformative, in a separate analysis, it might not have concluded that the purpose, under the
first factor, and the effect on the market, under the fourth factor, weighed against a finding of fair use.327
The creation of transformative works furthers the goals of
copyright.328 Some courts have required that a transformative
use be productive and employ the original material in a different manner or for a different purpose than the origina1.329 A
new work may not supersede the function, and therefore the
economic value, of the origina1.330 The majority of courts recognize a secondary work as a transformative work when sufficient new expression, meaning, or message has been added to
the origina1.331 Transformative works may quote the original
in a criticism of that work, expose a character from the original, or summarize an idea in order to either defend. or rebut
that notion. 332 In the instant case, Penguin may have exposed
the Cat.333
Although a transformative use is not a prerequisite to the
fair use defense, transformative works lie at the heart of the
doctrine's guarantee of protection for secondary works.334 New
works enrich society by adding value to the original work
through "new aesthetics, insights, and understandings. n335

327. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. The four statutory factors may not be
treated in isolation and each factor is to be analyzed independently, although the results must be weighed together in light of the goals of copyright. See id.
328. See id. at 579.
329. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1111. This approach was
adopted by the dissenters in Sony v. Universal, but rejected by the majority of the
Supreme Court. See id. at 1111 n.29.
330. See id. at 1111.
331. See Seu88 II, 109 F. 3d at 1400. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
332. See Toward A Fair Use Standard, supra note 25, at 1111. Transformative
uses may also include "parody, symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and innumerable
other uses." Id.
333. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1402.
334. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. The doctrine of fair use provides for
copying without permission under certain circumstances, as when the work was copied
to create a new work that performs a substantially different function than the original.
See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 962-63.
335. Jacobson, supra note 58, at 1001.
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Originality, however, is a prerequisite to copyrightability.336
Therefore, an important inquiry under the first factor is
whether the new work is transformative, an original
creation.337 On a sliding scale, the more transformative the
secondary work, the less significant are other subfactors, like a
commercial nature, under a purpose and character analysis.338
Generally, a parody is considered transformative, although a
transformative work need not be a parody.339
When considering whether an infringing work is transformative, it is helpful to look to the issues presented in claims of
copyrightability for derivative works.340 The threshold for
copyrightability of a derivative work incorporates an originality
requirement.341 The Copyright Act affords limited copyright
protection to derivative works, specifically by only recognizing
the contribution distinguishable from the original work.342 To
support an application for a copyright to a derivative work, the
originality within a derivative work must be more than
trivial.343 Analogous to the fair use analysis of effect on the
market, the derivative work cannot affect the scope of the copyright protection afforded to the preexisting material.344

336. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
337. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
338. See id.
339. See generally id.
340. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1996). Section 103(b) states:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the
material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from
the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any
exclusive tight in the preexisting material. The copyright in such a
work is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.
Id.
341. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996). "A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or
more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization,
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment,
condensation, or any other form in which the work may be recast, transformed, or
adapted." Id.
342. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(b); supra note 341 and accompanying text.
343. See Durham Ind., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F. 2d 905, 909 (2nd Cir. 1980). See
generally Entertainment Research Group, Inc. v. Genesis Creative Group, Inc., 122
F.3d 1211, 1220 (9th Cir. 1997).
344. See Durham, 630 F. 2d at 909.
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The Ninth Circuit considered whether the original aspects
of the secondary work were sufficient in Doran v. Sunset House
Distributing COrp.345 In Doran, the court noted that a copyrightable derivative work may be created by the original
author's own skill, labor, and judgment,' resulting in a contribution recognizably original to the prior treatment.346 Originality
means both that the particular work owes its origin to the
author and a modicum of creativity is embodied in the new
work.347 In Seuss Enterprises, the additions and modifications
made by the authors of The Cat NOT in the Hat! were creative
and anything but trivial.348 Although· the authors were inspired by The Cat in the Hat, they added new meaning to the
story of the mischievous Cat by recasting him in the role of the
"murderous" O.J. Simpson. 349 On its face, The Cat NOT in the
Hat! has sufficient originality to satisfy this threshold prerequisite for copyrightability of a derivative work.350
The Ninth Circuit cut short its analysis, or at least any
presentation of its deliberations, regarding whether The Cat
NOT in the Hat! was transformative.351 The court did not explain how the new work failed to incorporate original expression, meaning, or message.352 The court also failed to indicate
how this new work would have superseded the original work.353
A full consideration of these subfactors under the analysis of
purpose would have led the court to recognize the new work as
transformative.354 As a transformative work, The Cat NOT in

345. 197 F.Supp. 940, 943-44 (S.D. Cal. 1961), af/'d Sunset House Distributing
Corp. v. Doran, 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
346. See Doran, 197 F. Supp. at 944-45.
347. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340,362-63
(1991).
348. See generally Seus8 II, 109 F.3d at 140l.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See generally id. at 1399-1401.
352. See id.
353. See generally SeUS8 II, 109 F.3d at 1399-1401.
354. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-82.
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the Hat! could have been considered a fair use, after a full examination of the other statutory factors. 355

D. THE IMPoRTANT FOURTH FACTOR: EFFECT ON THE MARKET
The Ninth Circuit's decision contains a surprisingly brief
analysis of the important fourth factor: effect on the market.31l6
Based on the facts presented, the court is required to consider
each of the enumerated factors, weighed together, in light of
the goals of copyright.357 In addressing the fourth factor specifically, it is critical that the court's deliberation include an
examination of the economic consequences of the copying, such
as the failure to pay the customary price, market substitution,
and unremediable disparagement.358
With regard to failure to pay the customary price, the Ninth
Circuit failed to address the issue of market failure.359 Market
failure occurs when the infringer, spec~cally a parodist, can
not appropriately purchase its desired use through the
market.360 It is unlikely that an author will license a derivative
work that ridicules the original work or its style.361 Without a
chance that such a derivative work would be licensed, potentially-beneficial works would not reach the public, thus frustrating the goals of copyright and fair use.362 In this case,
Seuss Enterprises would have denied Penguin's use, thus triggering market failure. 363

355. See generally id. at 578-79.
356. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403. Compare Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94.
357. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (citing Toward A Fair Use, supra note 25, at
1110-11).
358. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590-94.
359. See generally Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403; supra note 201 and accompanying
text.
360. See Gordon, supra note 132, at 1632-34. An infringer is not required to inquire
about a license from the author of the original work, but the court does not discourage
such requests. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437.
361. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437.
362. See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 1012-13.
363. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 12, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). Seuss Enterprises was on record as
unwilling to license a parodic use for The Cat NOT in the Hat! See id. In Fisher, defendant requested permission and was denied. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 437. In Camp-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss1/5

44

Shapiro: Fair Use Defense

1998]

FAIR USE DEFENSE

45

Even though the court found The Cat NOT in the Hat! nontransformative, the court should have independently inquired
into whether market substitution was likely.364 In Leibowitz v.
Paramount,365 where the infringing work was recognized as a
parody, the court noted the unlikelihood that a consumer in the
market for a serious photograph commenting on the beauty of
pregnancy would satisfy her demand with a slapstick photograph of a smirking man's head atop a pregnant woman's
body.366
In Fisher v. Dees, the Ninth Circuit compared two equally
incongruous works, the original romantic, nostalgic ballad and
the 29-second new recording, about a glue-sniffing woman, that
ends in noise and laughter. 367 The court did not believe that
consumers would be equally satisfied by a purchase of either
one or the other.368 Instead, it concluded that the works did not
fulfill the same demand and therefore the new work had no
cognizable effect on the origina1.369
In Seuss Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit did not distinguish
its earlier Fisher decision.37o Even a superficial analysis shows
that market substitution in Seuss Enterprises was, virtually
non-existent given the market segment the infringers
targeted.371 Penguin's market consisted of adults with a macabre sense of humor, whereas Dr. Seuss' target market consists
of children and parents who cherish the classic tale of The Cat
in the Hat. 372 The books would be displayed in different sections in bookstores, The Cat NOT in the Hat! in the humor section and The Cat in the Hat in the children's early reader sec-

bell, the defendants requested permission and were denied. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at,
572-73.
364. See generally CampbeU, 510 U.S. at 578.
365. 948 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
366. See Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1226.
367. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438.
368. Seeid.
369. Seeid.
370. See generally Seus8 II, 109 F.3d at 1403.
371. See generally Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438; Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. at 1226.
372. See generally Seus8 II, 109 F.3d at 1396-97; Defs.' Pet. for Reb'g, at 13, Dr.
Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th eir. 1997) (No. 96-55619).
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tion, thereby minimizing any competition.373 The Cat NOT in
the Hat!, like "When Sonny Sniffs Glue," could not be a market
substitute for the original. 374
In Seuss Enterprises, the court failed to consider that Penguin's work was adult-oriented humor replete with new expression, meaning and message, entirely different from the original
work.375 One could hardly imagine a transformation more distinguishable from the original, aimed at an entirely different
audience.37s The subject matter of the original deals with the
ordinary pranks of childhood.377 In contrast, The Cat NOT in
the Hat! deals with the sophisticated nuances of our justice system through the retelling of a horrific double murder and the
ensuing public trial.37S Although the new work borrows from
the original to establish its main character as a trickster "Cat,"
it moves on to new ground and arguably transforms the original.379 As in Leibowitz, it is equally unlikely that a consumer
in search of bedtime reading for a young child would fulfill that
demand with a dark, comedic retelling of a double murder.380
In Seuss Enterprises, the Ninth Circuit should have analyzed
the issue of consumer substitution and found that The Cat
NOT in the Hat! is not a suitable market substitute for the
original.381
Market substitution may also be avoided by a minimal distribution of the new work in the market or if the infringer only

373. See Defs.' Pet. For Reh'g, at 13, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619).
374. See Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438.
375. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 10, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). See generally Seuss II, 109 F. 3d at 13991401.
376. See generally Fisher, 794 F.2d 432; Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. 1225.
377. See generally DR. SEUSS, THE CAT IN THE HAT (Random House 1957).
378. See generally SeussII, 109 F.3d at 1402-03.
379. Seeid.
380. See generally Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp at 1226.
.
381. See generally Fisher, 794 F.2d 432; Leibowitz, 948 F. Supp. 1225. The Ninth
Circuit simply concluded market substitution on the basis of the former conclusion that
The Cat NOT in the Hat! was both non-transformative and commercial. See Seuss II,
109 F.3d at 1403.
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borrows a small amount from the origina1.382 The planned distribution of the new work was only 12,000 copies, a minimal
distribution in the book publishing industry and a fraction of
Dr. Seuss' worldwide sales of 35 million books.383 When considering the amount borrowed, after the parodist conjures up
the original, how much more can be taken depends on whether
and to what degree the purpose of the new work is to parody
the origina1.384 Consequently, the issue of whether the parodist
could have taken less and still accomplished the parody becomes a relative consideration under this inquiry.385 In The
Cat NOT in the Hat!, the illustrator's choice to caricature O.J.
Simpson in the Cat's hat, expression, and pose, rather than
copy the Cat itself, suggests that the new work borrowed a
small amount from the original, just enough to conjure it Up.386
The Ninth Circuit also looked to the Second Circuit's holding in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson387 for guidance .in balancing the
benefit to the public if the infringing use were permitted, and
the projected personal gain of the copyright owner if the use
was denied.386 In MCA, the Second Circuit pointed out that the
less adverse the effect on the copyright owner's expected gain,
the lower the need to show public benefit to justify the use.389
AB the Ninth Circuit was willing to infer market harm because
Penguin's use of the original was non-transformative and
commercial, it was presumably more concerned about the potential gain to the copyright holder if the use was denied.390
There was effectively no adverse effect for the court to consider,
however, since the copyright holders had gone on record as unwilling to license a parodic use, such as Penguin intended.391

382. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580-81 n.14.
383. See Seussl1, 109 F.3d at 1396-97.
384. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89.
385. Seeid.
386. See supra note 304. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588-89.
387. 677 F.2d 180 (2nd Cir. 1981).
388. See Seuss II, 109 F.3d at 1403 (citing MCA, 677 F.2d at 183).
389. See MCA, 677 F.2d at 183.
390. See generally Seussl1, 109 F.3d at 1403.
391. See Defs.' Pet. for Reh'g, at 12, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA,
. 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619).
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Although the court considered the effect on Seuss' substantial
good will and reputation, such harm may fall under the category of unremediable disparagement, a non-cognizable harm
under copyright law.392 While it is arguable that a parodic
treatment of the O.J. Simpson trial would produce a public
benefit, that issue should not have been dispositive in this
case. 393
VI.

CONCLUSION

Parody, one of the oldest forms of literature, has proven to
be a potent form of social commentary and thus a powerful
force in society.394 In keeping with the goals of copyright, parody enriches society by its very nature.395 Having exhausted its
legal avenues, Penguin's parody, The Cat NOT in the Hat!, was
banned from pUblication.396 In addition to depriving the public
of The Cat NOT in the Hat!, the court's prohibition of the book's
publication sets a precedent that negatively impacts the efforts
of future parodists.397 Where the court's application of fair use
is not well understood and predictable, those that invest capital
in distributing creative works become extremely wary.398 In
fear of a similar disposition, conservative publishers may rely
on the Ninth Circuit's more restrictive reasoning.399 As a result

392. See Seuss 11, 109 F.3d at 1403; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. The associated
goodwill of a trademark is relevant under a trade dilution claim when considering
whether a trademark used in an unwholesome context has been tarnished. Keller &:
Bernstein, supra note 17, at 1173. In Seuss Enterprises, the lower court had already
determined there was minimal likelihood of success on a federal dilution claim. See
Seuss11, 109 F.3d at 1397.
393. See generally Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251-52; Piele, supra note 67, at 98.
394. See Jacobson, supra note 58, at 960-62.
395. See id.
396. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th
Cir. 1997) ("Seuss 11"). Penguin's petition for rehearing, tiled on April 17, 1997, was
denied by the Ninth Circuit. See Defs.' Pet. For Reh'g, Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-55619). Subsequently, Penguin's petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was also denied. See Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66
U.S.L.W.3170 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1997) (No. 97-329).
397. See generally Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, supra note 42, at 19-23;
Piele, supra note 67, at 100.
398. See generally Justice Souter's Rescue ofFair Use, supra note 42, at 21-22.
399. See id.
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of the chilling effect of uncertainty, a publisher may elect not to
publish what it believes to be a parodic work, out of fear that
the reviewing court will find the work a satire, rather than a
parody.4°O Such an effect deprives the public of social commentary and defies the goals of copyright; to encourage authors to
create works that ultimately benefit society.401
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